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NOTES
EMINENT DOMAIN FOR PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT - AN IRRATIONAL
BASIS FOR THE EROSION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
"[T]he government does not have unlimited power to redefine
property rights."'
The city destroys a family's home to construct luxury apartments.2
To benefit the public, a widow's property is seized for the construc-
tion of a casino's parking garage. 3 to effectuate a higher use of the
4land, a successful business is razed to make room for a larger one.
These are but a few of the types of actions municipal governments
have engaged in under the pretense of furthering the "public use."
This Note explores the questionable exercise of the eminent do-
main power by municipalities in furtherance of private development
projects. Part I briefly describes the historical roots and modem de-
velopment of the eminent domain power in America, as well as the
constitutional limitations placed upon its use. Part II examines the
increasing boldness with which municipalities have exercised this
power for private development and asserts that the current system
fails to provide adequate protection for constitutionally guaranteed
private property rights. Part III proposes a solution whereby tradi-
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982).
2 V. David Sartin, The Argument over West End: With 27 Years Invested, This Family
Wants to Stay, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 25, 2003, at B3.
3 City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev.
2003); see also discussion infra Part H.A.
4 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D.
Cal. 2001); see also discussion infra Part H.A.
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tional uses of eminent domain would be per se valid, but takings for
the purpose of conveyance to private entities would be subject to
strict scrutiny. Part IV suggests that the pendulum is swinging back
in favor of private property rights and that courts should endorse this
movement.
I. FROM ROADS TO SHOPPING MALLS - THE EVOLUTION OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Eminent Domain in the Early Republic
The Constitution did not create or explicitly grant the power of
eminent domain to the states; it assumed that such power existed as a
natural attribute of the state's sovereignty and imposed limitations on
its exercise. 5 These restrictions were contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.",6  Furthermore, all states either had,
or would eventually adopt, state constitutional provisions requiring
eminent domain to be used only for a public use and with just com-
pensation.7
The protection of private property was a major concern of the
founders. 8 Specifically, the founders were afraid of what would hap-
pen if a "faction" gained the majority and sought to impose its desires
upon the better-landed minority.9 The founders, being landowners
themselves, understood that if the government had the unrestricted
right to seize private property, it would be vulnerable to capture by a
5 See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The power of eminent domain
is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent State."); Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875) ("The right of eminent domain was ... well known when the Constitu-
tion was adopted....").
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis added).
7 RICHARD R. POWELL, 13 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.01(a)(iii) (noting that
every state constitution, except for North Carolina's, has a public use requirement, and even the
North Carolina courts have held that such a requirement exists notwithstanding its textual ab-
sence). The Fifth Amendment originally applied only to the federal government. Baron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (declaring that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment contains "no expression indicating an intention to apply them to state governments"). The
Supreme Court eventually required states to abide by Fifth Amendment restrictions by incorpo-
rating it into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1896) ("The conclusion of the court on this question is
that, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment compensation for private property taken
for public uses constitutes an essential element in 'due process of law,' and that without such
compensation the appropriation of private property to public uses, no matter under what form of
procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution.").
9 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey and McClellan eds.,
2001) (proposing that the Constitution would prevent government from undermining the foun-
dation of property as a reason for its ratification).
9 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Carey and McClellan eds., 2001).
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politically influential minority who may intend to upset the distribu-
tion of property.' 0
The judiciary has struggled with the interpretation of the Public
Use Clause since the early days of the republic." This struggle was
not particularly important in the years following the ratification of the
Fifth Amendment because the Public Use Clause was rarely liti-
gated.' 2  This lack of litigation is a result of what would come to be
known as the "narrow view" of the scope of eminent domain power.
3
The narrow view reflected the belief that public use was a rela-
tively simple concept that allowed for the taking of land when
it--quite literally-would be used by the public. 14 Under this narrow
view, the taking must have resulted in a facility that is physically ac-
cessible to some segment of the population. 15 Works such as roads,
bridges, libraries, schools, and parks were considered public uses, and
the government's right to exercise its power of eminent domain to
gather land for the construction of these works was well established.'
6
The Supreme Court stated that a landowner whose land was taken for
a purpose within this narrow view was damnum sine injuria-at a
loss without legal recourse. 17  Both state and federal' 8 courts em-
ployed this narrow view of the eminent domain power. 9
10 Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A
Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use," 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 569, 586 (2003)
(describing the various views of the founders regarding property rights).
11 POWELL, supra note 7, at § 79F.03(l) (outlining the "conflicting historical precedents"
regarding the term "public use").
12 See id. (explaining that for nearly 40 years the government only used the power of emi-
nent domain to build roads or construct dams).
13 Id.
14 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 67-68
(1986) (analyzing judicial tests for determining the meaning of "public").
15 Id.
16 Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (listing examples of commonly recognized pub-
lic uses justifying the use of eminent domain such as "forts, armories, and arsenals ... navy-
yards and light-houses ... custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses").
17 Smith v. Corp. of Wash., 61 U.S. 135, 148 (1857) (holding that removing trees from a
lawn to make room for grading the road was a permissible public use).
18 The federal government itself did not actually have the power of eminent domain until
1875. Until that point, they were dependent upon states' using their eminent domain powers
and then conveying the property to the federal government. See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371.
19 Prior to the Congressional grant to the federal courts of general federal question juris-
diction, and jurisdiction over actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state actors for constitu-
tional violations, most cases involving questions of federal constitutional rights were adjudi-
cated in state courts. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 68 N.E. 522 (Ill. 1903) (applying
federal law to strike down an attempt to take land for the construction of a private mill); Clark v.
Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905) (stating a preference for allowing state courts to determine the
validity of public use challenges).
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B. The Rise of the Public Benefit Test
Eventually the Supreme Court began to take a less restrictive ap-
proach to the use of eminent domain that would come to replace the
narrow view. 20 The legal landscape became more complicated as the
narrow view gave way to a different test-judging public use by ac-
tivity that benefits the public rather than just physical occupation of
land.2' The Court consummated its embrace of the public benefit test,
and thus its departure from the narrow view, in the landmark case of
Berman v. Parker. 
22
In Berman, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
Washington D.C.'s plan to use eminent domain for redeveloping an
area of the city that had deteriorated into slums. 23 Congress deter-
mined that "conditions existing within the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use
of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injurious
to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. ,,24
A department store owner, whose property was within the area tar-
geted for the taking, challenged the legality of this action.25 The
storeowner claimed that the taking was unconstitutional because his
store was not blighted like the surrounding properties and was thus
outside the scope of the statute authorizing the taking.26 He further
claimed that the taking violated the Public Use Clause because the
property would be transferred to a private party for redevelopment
27
once it was condemned.
The Court rejected the landowner's challenge and upheld the tak-
ing, declaring that the Public Use Clause gives a great amount of def-
erence to legislative definitions of public use. "Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive., 28 If there
20 See, e.g., Mt. Vemon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30, 32 (1916) (describing the requirement of physical use as inadequate).
21 See Merrill, supra note 14, at 68 (outlining the historical trends leading to the change in
the view of the courts).
22 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
23 Id. at 28.
24 Id. The rest of the examples of eminent domain used in this note involve municipali-
ties. In this situation, Congress was acting as the legislative body in charge of the nation's
capital. Id. at 31 (analogizing Congress' legislative power over the capital to the powers of the
states). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress plenary authority over the
capital).
25 Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 32.
[Vol. 55:2
EMINENT DOMAIN FOR PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
was any doubt left about the Court's abdication of its role in making
public use determinations, the Court removed it when it stated:
[T]he legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of
the public needs to be served by social legislation ... [t]his
principle admits of no exception merely because the power of
eminent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in de-
termining whether that power is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one.29
To prevent observers from mistaking Berman to stand merely for
the narrow holding of expanding public use to include slum clearance
or promoting health and safety, the Court justified its holding through
an analysis of the "police power." 30 The Court wrote that protecting
public safety and health are classic examples of the police power, and
that "[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent
domain is merely the means to the end.' States and municipalities
seized upon this deference by engaging in a host of takings that al-
most certainly would have been deemed private rather than public
before Berman.
32
C. The Ambiguous Line Between Public and Private Use
The seminal case of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit3 3 is an example of what was at the time a novel interpretation
of public use. In Poletown, General Motors threatened to close its
Detroit plant if the city would not help it acquire land upon which to
expand its factory.34 The city yielded to General Motors' wishes and
condemned a tract of 500 acres, including residential property. This
act resulted in a legal challenge by several residents who claimed that
the taking was nothing more than the city using its eminent domain
power to allow a private corporation to generate more profit.35 The
residents claimed that the expansion was for a private use and thus it
violated the requirements of the Public Use Clause. The city re-
29 Id.
30 Id. ("We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn
on its own facts.").
31 Id. at 33.
32 See discussion infra Part II.A.
33 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
34 Id. at 458.
35 Id.
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sponded by arguing that retaining an industrial base, and the employ-
ment opportunities that coincided with it, constituted a public use.
3 6
Over two strongly written dissents,37 the Poletown court ruled that
the taking was a public use because the city council determined that
the increased tax revenue and rise in employment would benefit the
city. 38 The Poletown court, following the Berman court's lead, con-
cluded that once the legislature has determined that a particular act is
a public use, "[t]he Court's role after such a determination is made is
limited., 39 Although Poletown was decided primarily on state consti-
tutional grounds, the relevant language of the state constitutional pro-
vision40 is substantially the same as the Takings Clause, and the Pole-
town decision was indicative of the direction in which much of the
judiciary, both state and federal, was about to embark regarding pub-
lic use.
Soon after Poletown, the United States Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the task of determining whether an even more obvious
transfer of property from one private party to another fell within the
rubric of the Public Use Clause. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid-
kiff,41 the Hawaii legislature determined that 47% of the state's land
was held by a mere 72 individuals, and "concluded that concentrated
land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee
simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquil-
ity and welfare. ' ' 2
The Hawaii legislature's solution was to create an agency, the Ha-
waii Housing Authority, with the statutory authority to condemn a
lessor's land and transfer it to the lessee.4 3 Several landowners whose
land was subject to such condemnation challenged the constitutional-
ity of the statute in federal district court claiming that it violated the
Public Use Clause, but they were unsuccessful.an The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit granted the landowners a brief victory by
reversing the district court and holding that the act was a "naked at-
tempt ... to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely
36 Id. Even the dissent took judicial notice of Detroit's 18% unemployment rate. Id. at
465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); Id. at 464 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 458-59.
39 Id.
40 See MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation....").
41 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
42 Id. at 231.
43 Id. at 233-34.
44 See Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 70 (D. Haw. 1979), rev'd, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd sub nom. Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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for B's private use and benefit., 45 However, upon granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and reaffirmed the con-
stitutionality of Hawaii's land condemnation regime.46
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated, "where the exer-
cise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceiv-
able public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to
be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. ' '47 Justice O'Connor then
noted that Hawaii's rational basis for taking from a lessor and giving
to a lessee is "to reduce the perceived social and economic evils" of
concentrated land ownership.48
There can be no doubt that Midkiff further relaxed the protection of
the Public Use Clause, yet the Court would have had no way to pre-
dict that it had opened a "Pandora's Box" of interference with indi-
vidual property rights.49 A closer examination of the aforementioned
cases, and their successors, demonstrates the extent to which the
modem interpretation of public use has failed to be much of a restric-
tion upon governmental takings for private purposes.
PART II: THE CURRENT PUBLIC USE REGIME IS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Examples of Eminent Domain Abuse
Armed with the knowledge that courts will defer to their judgment
about the definition of public use, municipalities have become in-
creasingly bold in their use of eminent domain. 50 The following are
just a few all too common examples of the use of eminent domain for
takings that would previously have been considered private in nature
rather than public.5'
45 Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983). rev'd sub nom. Haw. Housing Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
46 Haw. Housing Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added). Whether such a concentrated land ownership creates
an actual social and economic evil is debatable. Professor Richard A. Epstein noted that, "[n]o
antitrust expert thinks 'oligopoly' because there are 'only' seventy or twenty-two or eighteen
landowners in a given market." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 181 (1985).
49 See Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 285, 294 (2000) (explaining how Berman affected eminent domain jurisprudence).
50 See DANA BERLINER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE
YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3 (2003),
available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/report/report/shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) (de-
scribing the large increase in private takings by municipalities in the last five years).
5 For other examples, see generally id. at 3, 10-217 (listing a state-by-state analysis of re-
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The city of Las Vegas took action to condemn a widow's land
upon which she relied for rental income for the allegedly "public use"
of expanding a casino's parking lot.52 The city argued that the park-
ing lot was a public use because it would allow greater access to
53downtown attractions and would revitalize the downtown economy.
Because the city agency charged with revitalization lacked the re-
sources on its own to build the parking garage, it used its eminent
domain power to seize thirty-two parcels of land, which it then trans-
ferred to a consortium of casinos for development.
54
Casino parking lots have not been the only amenity that cities have
acquired for private developers. The City of Detroit failed to see the
need to stop with just a parking lot and instead used its eminent do-
main power to make room for actual casinos. The city justified its
action by arguing that the casinos would generate additional tax reve-
nue and thus benefit the public.56
As egregious and seemingly private in nature as these two exam-
ples are, they pale in comparison to that which happened a few years
ago in Merriam, Kansas. Local businessman William Gross was sur-
prised to discover that the city had condemned his used car lot in or-
der to make way for the expansion of a neighboring BMW dealer-
ship.57 The city justified the action by claiming that the BMW dealer-
ship would bring in an additional $500,000 in tax revenue. 58 In re-
sponse, Mr. Gross offered to transform his business into a Mitsubishi
ported abuses over a five year period).
52 See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 6-7
(Nev. 2003).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 10-11.
55 See George Cantor, Las Vegas Can Teach Detroit About Casino Location, DETROIT
NEWS, Mar. 11, 2000, at 8C ("If the city had put half the effort into obtaining land in the area
originally discussed as the casino district as it has trying to acquire it by eminent domain on the
river, the process would be much farther ahead.").
56 See Peter J. Kulick, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use In Order To
Effectuate a "Public-Private Taking": A Proposal To Redefine "Public Use", 2000 L. REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 639 (2000); R.J. King, Casinos in Detroit: City Casinos Will Draw Few Busi-
nesses: Real Estate Experts Don't Expect Much Around Temporaries, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 20,
1999, at 4B (reporting that the casinos will bring in $181,000,000 in annual revenue to the city
and state). It is ironic that Detroit determined that a casino fell within the Berman court's ap-
proval of a statute that authorized blighting for those properties that are "injurious to the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare...." Berman v. United States, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954) (em-
phasis added). Apparently, for $181,000,000, Detroit considered casinos to be a public use that
outweighed the social costs.
57 DANA BERLINER, CASTLE COALITION, GOVERNMENT THEFT: THE TOP 10 ABUSES OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (2002), available at
http://www.castlecoalition.com/top-10_abuses/top-10-report.pdf, at 5 (last visited Oct. 9,
2004).
58 Id.
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dealership, which would have generated $150,000 more in tax reve-
nue than what his used car lot produced, but the city refused.59 "It
wanted the BMWs., 60 How this could be seen as anything other than
taking from A for the sole benefit of B61 is a conclusion that only the
Merriam City Council could divine.
Relying upon the Berman model, many takings with a question-
able public use were executed under the guise of clearing away
"blight." 62 Blight came to represent more than just unseemly or di-
lapidated property; it was instead used as a term of art to represent
property that the city intended to seize for redevelopment. As a
mayor of a city which had employed this tactic explained, "it really
doesn't have a lot to do with whether or not your home is
painted ... The question is whether or not that area can be used for a
higher and better use. 63
The desire for a "higher and better" use is frequently a justification
for taking private property for the purpose of private development. 64
The argument is that if a "higher" use is available for a piece of prop-
erty, then the government can use eminent domain as the instrumen-
tality to effectuate such a use.65 The flaw with this rationale is that it
is difficult for one to imagine a scenario in which a large corporation,
or other organized entity favoring the taking, does not win so long as
the property in question is owned by an individual, or any entity less
organized or influential than the proposed takers. This rule weighs
heavily against the individual property owner because "[e]verybody's
home would produce more tax revenue as an office building., 66
59 Id.
6 Id.
6! An early Supreme Court case, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), cited the taking of
property from A and giving it to B as an example of a law "against all reason and justice ....
Id. at 388.
62 See generally BERLINER, supra note 50. Eradicating "blight" has been a frequent excuse
for using eminent domain for private development, even though the Midkiff court made it clear
that the Public Use Clause is not limited to clearing blight, but expands to the full boundaries of
the state's police power. Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
63 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain: Being Abused? (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 28,
2003), transcript available at
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml (last visited Oct. 9,
2004) [hereinafter 60 Minutes] (quoting then-mayor Madeline Cain of Lakewood, Ohio).
64 Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Requiring Public
Use For Which Property Is Condemned To Be "More Necessary" Or "Higher Use" Than Public
Use To Which Property Is Already Appropriated - State Takings, 49 A.L.R.5TH 769, 769
(1997).
65 Id.; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
66 Blaine Harden, In Ohio, a Test for Eminent Domain: Rights vs. Renewal at Stake in
Case, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 22, 2003, at A03 (quoting Dana Berliner of the Institute for
Justice, a public interest law firm which has litigated a number of public use challenges).
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Perhaps such a transformation from a supposedly lower use to a
higher one would be more palatable if there were some objective test
for ensuring fairness; however, the law as it exists now entrusts the
decision about whether property has a higher use to the very agency
that is proposing the taking. This fox-guarding-the-henhouse policy
disregards the constitutional and historical protections afforded by the
concept of separation of powers.67
B. Municipal-Corporate Abuse
Why have citizens, who ultimately have the power to control the
legislature's membership, allowed the government to grant special
privileges to General Motors, BMW, and casinos when it ultimately
results in the erosion of property rights? Public-choice theory reveals
some answers.
68
The current state of eminent domain jurisprudence is a manifesta-
tion of the Madisonian warning against the dangers of factions. 69 By
allowing a locally elected body to make determinations about which
uses are public enough to justify the use of eminent domain, an incen-
tive exists for developers to pursue their goals through the political
process rather than through free exchange.70  One observer summa-
rized the situation by writing that "modern government has a lot to
offer, and its constituents are increasingly all too eager to pursue 
it."71
This problem, described in economics literature as rent-seeking,72
reduces the transaction costs that a developer must undertake because
they are no longer dependent upon negotiating the sale of property
with the landowner.73 Yet the gains in efficiency are offset by the
67 See infra Part I.B. 1.
68 See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 100 (1995) (defining public-choice theory as "[t]he study of decision making as it
affects the formulation and operation of collective organizations such as governments . . . the
principles and methodology of economics are applied to political science").
69 Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L.
REV. 173, 174-75 (2003).
70 Professor Thomas Merrill suggests that judicial deference is due to a focus on the ends
of the acquisition of property rather than the means used to acquire it. See Merrill, supra note
14, at 64-65. Even an outright prohibition on the use of eminent domain would not require
government to abandon its land use policies; it would merely require them to be pursued in the
marketplace through negotiation rather than through coercion. Cf Guido Calabresi & A. Doug-
las Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972) (describing various levels of protection available for
securing entitlements such as property).
71 Simpson, supra note 69, at 173.
72 Rent-seeking describes actions taken to acquire wealth by using the political process to
plunder others rather than investing in positive-sum production. GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra
note 68, at 842.
73 EPSTEIN supra note 48, at 5.
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loss of property rights. The notion of free alienability is a fundamen-
tal property right;74 transfers of land through rent-seeking activities
rather than market forces rob the landowner of her alienability rights
and create market inefficiency by removing decisions from the mar-
ketplace and inserting them into the political sphere.75
The political process provides an incentive for the legislative body
to seek favor from organized interest groups in order to raise money
and gain votes, even if it is at the expense of individual landowners. 76
This state of affairs led one scholar to write, "one could conclude that
such exercises of the eminent domain power are nothing more than a
form of welfare for corporations and a source of votes for politi-
cians. 77
Justice Ryan of the Michigan Supreme Court predicted this even-
tuality in his Poletown dissent when he warned that, "[w]ith this case
the Court has subordinated a constitutional right to private corporate
interests. 78 Justice Ryan was particularly concerned with the power
that his court's decision would grant to corporate interests. "[W]hen
the private corporation to be aided by eminent domain is as large and
influential as General Motors, the power of eminent domain, for all
practical purposes, is in the hands of the private corporation. The
municipality is merely the conduit. 79
Corporations have seized upon the opportunity to use municipali-
ties as their own personal real estate agents.80 In Lakewood, Ohio, a
property owner was told that his home was "blighted" because it
lacked central air conditioning and an attached two-car garage, and
thus would be seized to make room for the construction of a shopping
mall and luxury apartments. The property owner summarized the
threat that these actions pose to individual property rights as follows:
"I thought I bought this place. But I guess I just leased it, until the
city wants it."
8 1
The examples described above suggest that municipalities have
become mere conduits for corporate transactions. Indeed, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that the Detroit City Council would decide on its own
74 Id. at 74; 63C AM. JUR. 2d Property § 35 ("One of the principal and most important
rights incident to ownership is alienability, or the right to disposition.").
75 See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 68, at 842.
76 See id. at 836-37.
77 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC. L. REV. 49, 50 (1999).
78 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 482 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 481 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
80 Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause
and the Erosion of the "Public Use" Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 543 (2002).
81 60 Minutes, supra note 63 (quoting Lakewood resident Jim Saleet).
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to construct a casino without the prodding of the casino owners.
Likewise, it is doubtful that Merriam, Kansas would spontaneously
decide to recruit a BMW dealership, or that Las Vegas would courte-
ously build a parking garage just in case someone needed it. All of
these actions were taken in response to corporate requests. The
strength of special interest influence over the eminent domain process
raises the issue of whether holding property is a "right" at all,82 or
merely a convenience that a citizen is allowed to enjoy until the gov-
ernment realizes that there could be a "higher use."
How have property rights come to exist only at the whim of gov-
ernment? The answer lies in the level of scrutiny that modem courts
applied following Poletown and Midkiff.
C. Rational Basis Test
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,83 the Supreme Court reit-
erated that it would apply the rational basis test when reviewing chal-
lenges brought under the Public Use Clause.84 The Court has devel-
oped other standards over the years for reviewing the constitutionality
of statutes,85 but rational basis is the most deferential to the legisla-
ture. The rational basis test is not uniquely required by the Fifth
Amendment; it is used whenever any police power action is chal-
lenged, not just a taking. By relying on the rational basis test, the
courts fail to recognize whether the Fifth Amendment provides any
additional restriction on government action than would exist without
it. This realization has led several commentators to describe the Pub-
lic Use Clause as constitutional dead letter.86
82 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972) ("It cannot be doubted
that among the civil rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the
Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property." (quoting
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948))).
83 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
84 Id. at 243 ("Redistribution of fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market deter-
mined by the state legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the
eminent domain power. Therefore, the Hawaii statute must pass the scrutiny of the Public Use
Clause.").
85 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to a
law school admissions program that gave preferential treatment to certain racial groups over
others); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S 702, 720 (1997) (stating that strict scrutiny applies
to government infringement upon fundamental rights); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
524 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a state educational program that treated students
differently based upon gender).
86 See, e.g., Lazzarotti, supra note 77, at 59 ("Considering the judiciary's all but complete
and total deference to legislative determinations of what constitutes a public use, a court's
ability to review these cases is almost non-existent."); Jennifer M. Klemestrud, Note, The Use of
Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. REV. 783, 784 (1999) (noting that
"virtually any acquisition meets the criteria of serving the public interest or contributing to a
public purpose. The public use limitation is thus generally meaningless...").
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The rational basis test simply asks whether "the statute is ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest.' '87  If the question can be
answered in the affirmative, which it almost always can,88 then courts
refuse to interfere. It is only in the rare circumstance when the gov-
ernment cannot justify its action as rationally related whatsoever that
the court will nullify the statute.89 Specifically, the Midkiff court used
the phrase "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose . . .90
This language suggests that "in its search for a 'rational basis,' courts
can supply a purpose the legislature itself missed."9 1 Thus, if the leg-
islature itself is unable to justify the taking, it need not worry; the
court will try to come up with a justification for them.
The Midkiff court insisted that purely private takings were still
prohibited under the Public Use Clause,92 but given the deferential
nature of the rational basis test, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in
which an eminent domain action could not rationally be justified as a
public use. If the city were to condemn person A's land for the sole
purpose of transferring it to person B for her private use, there could
still arguably be a rational explanation. Perhaps person B would put
the property to a "higher use," or generate more tax revenue.93 If not,
then perhaps the government decided that A owned too much land
and that this could conceivably affect real estate prices.94 Even if the
government wanted to play Robin Hood and take from rich person A
to give to poor person B, it could argue that its actions were rational
by claiming that it is reducing homelessness, reducing crime or pro-
moting health. If all of the above justifications fail, the government
could simply claim to be clearing out "blight."
There needs to be a change in order to protect property rights and
breathe life back into the Public Use Clause. Yet the question re-
mains whether it is possible to reconcile individual property rights
with the power of the state by any means other than complete defer-
87 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
88 But see id. (striking down a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy under the rational basis
test); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (striking down a
zoning ordinance that prohibited mentally handicapped people from living within a flood zone
but allowed a hospital to be constructed in the same location).
89 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (stating that the court will not overturn a
statute unless it is "so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes
that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational.").
90 Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984) (emphasis added).
91 EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 162.
92 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
93 See, e.g., City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d I
(Nev. 2003).
94 See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229.
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ence to the legislature through the rational basis test.95 The next sec-
tion of this Note offers a solution that recognizes the historical con-
cept of eminent domain as a sovereign prerogative while still protect-
ing the rights of property owners.
HI. COURTS SHOULD APPLY A BIFURCATED TEST TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A PROPOSED USE IS ACTUALLY PUBLIC
A. Suggested Approach
Courts need to make an actual determination of whether or not a
use is public. Those deemed public are permitted,96 whereas the Pub-
lic Use Clause would bar those held to be private. The difficult ques-
tion with which the judiciary has struggled is how to determine
whether a use is sufficiently public enough to meet the Fifth Amend-
ment's requirements. To make this determination, there must be judi-
cially manageable standards for courts to follow. There are a number
of constitutional provisions that courts have refused to enforce due to
lack of standards.97 Yet in the case of the Public Use Clause, there are
standards available if the Court would just be willing to use them.
The simplest standard to apply is the old "narrow view" requiring
physical accessibility to the public. Because the uses contemplated
by this view are historically accepted as public, if a taking is within it
then it is a per se public use and the courts should not interfere. In
these narrow situations, the rational basis test should apply and grant
the same deference to the legislature that the Midkiff standard cur-
rently does. It is the remaining class of cases that pose a greater chal-
lenge and require a higher level of scrutiny. In those cases where the
taking in question does not fall within the narrow view, there is a
greater risk of legislative abuse and thus a heightened level of scru-
tiny is necessary to protect individual property rights.98
95 See Simpson, supra note 69, at 197-98 (noting that "[i]n a country whose founders
fought a revolution in large part to prevent arbitrary seizures of property, it is no small irony that
today state and local governments regularly take land from private owners and sell it to well-
connected developers and private businesses...").
96 This assumes, of course, that the constitutionally required "just compensation" is paid.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872) (stating that the boundaries
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §
1, are for the States to determine); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (holding that
the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, is nonjusticiable).
98 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60
(1981) ("[A] court inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the
predominant interest being advanced.").
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One solution to the challenge of determining whether a particular
taking has violated the Public Use Clause is to create the same rebut-
table presumption against the government action as would be used in
any other case involving a fundamental right.99 This is not to suggest
that the Constitution positively grants the right to own property; it
does not. What the constitution does fundamentally guarantee is that
if one does own property, it can only be taken for a public use. The
text of the Constitution in no way suggests that this right, even though
phrased in the negative, is in any way less fundamental than that of
freedom of speech, religion or the press. 100
In order to treat the Public Use Clause as being protective of a
fundamental right it needs to receive the same level of scrutiny as
other fundamental rights. It is well settled that when a government
action infringes upon a fundamental right, such action is subject to
strict scrutiny analysis. 0 1 Strict scrutiny requires the governmental
action to be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 0 2 Be-
cause of the high threshold required by this standard, most govern-
ment actions do not pass constitutional muster once the Court deter-
mines that this standard applies. 10 3 If a taking passes this test, only
then should its boundaries be coterminous with those of the police
power.'l 4 This approach would not require judicial micromanage-
ment. For example, if a taking to construct an apartment complex
survived strict scrutiny analysis, the court would not need to approve
every wallpaper design or carpet pattern as these could be left to the
legislature's police power. If the ends are legitimate and compelling
and the means constitutional (meaning that the taking has survived
this test), then the court need not micromanage the details of the exe-
cution as it has already determined that the action is within the gov-
99 E.g. Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 1294 (2004) ("[Ajbsent consent or exigency, a
warrantless search of a home is presumptively unconstitutional."); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) ("It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.").
1°°These First Amendment guarantees are also phrased in the negative. "Congress shall
make no law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200(7th Cir. 1983) (reiterating that "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive
liberties.").
101 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
103 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (stating "we wish to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"' yet still striking down
the statute in question by applying strict scrutiny). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
325 (2003) (holding that a law school admissions policy which gave preferences to certain racial
groups was compelling enough to withstand strict scrutiny).
104 C.f Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (describing the breadth
of eminent domain as coterminous with the police power).
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eminent's police power and thus within the government's discretion
for its implementation.
Of course, just using the strict scrutiny buzzwords "narrowly tai-
lored" and "compelling governmental interest" fails to give much
guidance to a court as a practical matter.' But surely finding stan-
dards for adjudicating Public Use claims is no more difficult than
finding standards to determine whether a search and seizure was un-
reasonable, 06 or a whether a particular punishment was cruel and
unusual.10 7 In fact, there are states that have developed their own
standards to assist in making this determination, and have clearly ar-
ticulated that the courts rather than the legislature are responsible for
determining public use.
For example, North Carolina devised a system whereby the courts
seek to determine whether the "paramount reason for taking of the
land to which objection is made is the public interest, to which bene-
fits to private interests are merely incidental, or whether... the private
interests are paramount and controlling and the public interests
merely incidental."10 8
In Stout v. City of Durham,109 landowners challenged the city of
Durham's quest to acquire land through eminent domain in order to
expand its sewer system to accommodate a proposed shopping cen-
ter. t ( Although the property owners lost their challenge,"' the rele-
vant consideration is that the court adjudicated the merits of whether
the proposed taking fit within the public use requirement, rather than
merely leaving the decision to the legislature.
The test proffered by this Note would have produced the same re-
sult. Because the issue involved the physical expansion of a sewer
system, the facts of the case fit within the per se exclusion for narrow
view takings and the analysis would end without having to conduct a
strict scrutiny inquiry.
Washington is another example of a state that has developed spe-
cific standards for judicial determination of public use. In Washing-
ton v. Evans," 2 the Washington Supreme Court reiterated these stan-
dards: "This court has developed a three-part test to evaluate eminent
domain cases. For a proposed condemnation to be lawful, the State
105 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S 515, 567 (1996) ("These tests are no more scientific
than their names suggest .... ").
06 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10, See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
108 Stout v. City of Durham, 468 S.E.2d 254, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
109468 S.E. 2d 254.
10 Id.
I ld. at 75 7 -58.
112966 P.2d 1252 (Wash. 1998).
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must prove that (1) the use is public; (2) the public interest requires it;
and (3) the property appropriated is necessary for that purpose." 1 13
In Evans, a convention center sought to condemn land in order to
expand." 4 Because the proposed expansion included private shops,
the landowner whose land was in question objected because the tak-
ing would primarily benefit a private party. The Washington Su-
preme Court applied its three-part test and determined that the taking
was permissible.
The strict scrutiny test would require only that the governmental
interest be "compelling," rather than having to be "required" or "nec-
essary." However, the Evans court would have come to the same
conclusion had it been decided under the strict scrutiny test because it
too falls within the per se exclusion for physical occupation, in this
case a physical expansion of the convention center.
While the two aforementioned cases are illustrative of the devel-
opment of judicially manageable standards, they admittedly do not
offer much help to a federal court trying to tread upon the new ground
of public use adjudication because both involve the relatively easy
issue of physical use. An example of a state that has developed stan-
dards to determine whether takings for private development are per-
missible is Arizona.
In Bailey v. Myers," 5 the city of Mesa, Arizona sought to condemn
land currently occupied by a small family business, "Bailey's Brake
Service," and transfer it to Ace Hardware to make room for Ace to
expand." 16 The Baileys challenged this action, claiming that it was an
illegal taking for private use." 7 The City of Mesa gave the now fa-
miliar response of seeking to increase property values, employment
and tax revenue." 8
However, in contrast to all of the cases reviewed thus far in this
Note, the Arizona Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner and
invalidated the taking as being private rather than public." 9 Although
the court based much of its decision on the Arizona Constitution, 20
the underlying reasoning could apply to the Public Use Clause as
well.
13 1d. at 1255.
1141d. at 1253-54.
1576 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
116 Id. at 900.
117 Id.
18 Id. at 901.
H9 Id. at 904.
12°7The court specifically relied upon ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17, cl. I ("Private property
shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity .... ").
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The Bailey court applied a two-part test to determine whether a
specific taking was permissible or not. The first question the court
asked was whether the public would physically use the property.'12  If
so, then the taking is "unquestionably public" and is permitted.
22
The court also allows takings that are "essential for the provision of
public services or for reasons of public safety or health. 123 Although
this appears to provide an exception that would allow the uses in
Berman, such as slum clearance or the promotion of health, to pass
the test, it qualifies the exception by requiring it to be "essential."
Thus, whereas Arizona considers takings that result in physical use to
be coterminous with the police power, those actions that can only be
justified as promoting public safety or health are subjected to a
heightened level of scrutiny in that they are required to be "essential."
If the proposed taking does not fit within those categories and in-
stead "the government proposes to take property and then convey it to
private developers for private commercial use, a significant question
is presented because of the intended disposition of the property."'
24
The court answered this "significant question" by applying a "sub-
stantially outweighs" test requiring that the proposed public use sub-
stantially outweigh the private nature of the use. 12 5 While the court
listed a number of factors to consider in determining whether a public
use substantially outweighs a private one, 26 the court stressed that
this list is not exhaustive. 
27
Applying this test to the facts before it, the Bailey court held that
the taking was a prohibited taking of property for private use. 28 The
test proposed in this Note would have reached the same result. Both
tests begin by asking about physical use by the public. In Bailey, the
expansion of a hardware store did not meet this criterion so the court
proceeded to the next question. It is at this stage of the analysis that
these two tests differ. In Arizona, the next question would be whether
121 Bailey, 76 P.3d at 902 (permitting takings "[w]hen the government proposes to take a
person's property to build streets, jails, government buildings, libraries or public parks that the
government will own or operate...").
12
2 Id.
123 Id. at 904.
124 Id. at 902.
1251d. at 904.
1261d. (listing such factors as: whether title to the property would be held by a public en-
tity; whether the property will be used for private, non-profit, or public purposes; the amount of
control the condemning agency will retain over the property; the ratio of public to private funds
used for the development of the property; whether a private party or a public entity would bene-
fit most; whether private developers are the primary motivation for the taking; whether the
taking would result in harm, loss, or detriment to members of the community; and the necessity
of the taking for the achievement of public purposes).
127 Id. at 904, n. 5.
128 Id. at 904.
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the public use behind the proposed taking substantially outweighs the
private nature of the use. The Bailey court found that it did not. Un-
der the strict scrutiny test, the next question would be whether the
taking was narrowly tailored toward a compelling governmental in-
terest. As with other strict scrutiny applications, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the answer to this question is in the negative. , 29
It is difficult to map the contours of these tests to determine if they
would overlap each other or not because neither the Supreme Court
nor the Arizona courts have ever been able to give an objective defi-
nition of what constitutes a "compelling interest" or what exactly
"substantially outweighs" means. In fact, both courts have stated that
there is no objective definition and that the test applies differently
depending upon the specific facts of the case.1 30
The most important aspect of Bailey is that the Arizona Court of
Appeals made a judicial determination of whether a taking was public
or private rather than simply yielding such judgment to the legisla-
ture, as the Supreme Court had done in Berman and Midkiff.13' This
shows that it is possible for courts to make such a determination and
develop standards for doing so. Phrases such as "compelling interest"
and "narrowly tailored" may be somewhat obscure and beyond pre-
cise definition, yet they are apparently concrete enough for the judici-
ary to have applied them countless times in other cases involving fun-
damental rights. The court cannot abdicate its role as guardian of in-
dividual rights merely because the task is a difficult one. 132
B. Counterarguments Considered
A number of justifications have been presented in support of al-
lowing the legislature to determine public use without fear of judicial
intervention. This section will explore the failings of such counter-
arguments insofar as they argue against strict scrutiny analysis. Spe-
cifically, this section will dispel the myths that the legislature is best
129 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (describing government actions
which infringe upon fundamental rights as presumptively unconstitutional).
130 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing the application of heightened scrutiny as less than scientific and used whenever the Court
decides that it "seems like a good idea to load the dice"); Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 902(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that the issue of public use must be decided "on a case-by-case
basis").
131 Such determination is required by the Arizona Constitution. See ARiZ. CONST. art. II §
17, cl. 3 (requiring that courts determine public use regardless of the legislature's determina-tion).
32 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1824) (noting that, "[tihe judiciary cannot, as
the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We[the Supreme Court] cannot pass it by because it is doubtful."). However, this is precisely what
courts have done by yielding their role of protecting Fifth Amendment rights to the legislatures.
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suited to make public use determinations, the political process pro-
vides relief from legislative abuse, and that the just compensation
requirement provides enough protection for individual property
rights.
1. The Legislature is in the Best Position to Determine Public Use
Some have argued that courts should defer to the legislature be-
cause the legislature, as the elected representatives of the people, is in
a better position to determine whether an action is an appropriate pub-
lic use.' 3 3 Such a scenario would certainly be more efficient, but the
Constitution does not exist to promote efficiency; it exists to defend
liberty.
The legislature, of course, is charged with the task of acting in the
public's interest. However, creating public uses and being the ulti-
mate arbiter of the legality of those uses are two distinct functions.
Allowing the legislature to determine the legality of its own actions is
comparable to allowing a man to be a judge in his own case.' 34 Madi-
son reiterated a common law maxim when he declared, "[n]o man is
allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integ-
rity." 35 Judicial review of public use designations is necessary to
ensure compliance with constitutional limitations on government ac-
tion. Removing the possibility of meaningful judicial review removes
the guarantee that these constitutional limitations will be enforced.
The maintenance of separation of powers requires the various
branches of the federal government to act as a check on each other.
136
As coordinate branches of government, neither can abuse its authority
without raising the ire of another.' 37 Removing the courts from this
necessary tension allows legislative power to go unchecked; leading
to many of the abuses described in Part II.
The only way to ensure that legislative authority remains within its
limits is to allow outside influence to serve as a check on its power.
Some argue that the political process provides such a check, but a
closer examination reveals that this argument is also flawed.
133 Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) ("[Llegislatures are better
able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.").
134 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 44 (Madison) (Carey and McClellan ed., 2001).
135 Id.
136 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (stating that the system of "checks and
balances established in the Constitution was regarded by the Framers as a 'self-executing safe-
guard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."'
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976))).
'
37 See id.
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2. The Political Process Provides Enough Protection for Property
Rights
Some have argued that judicial intervention is not needed because
the political process will protect property owners since they could
reverse any governmental action by replacing their representatives at
the next election.' 38 This may be true if the governmental action in-
volved acts against the interests of the majority. 139 However, if the
intrusion is upon the liberty of a minority of citizens, then "the form
of popular government . . . enables [the majority] to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest, both the public good, and private
rights .... ,,140
Applying this rationale to the eminent domain context, when the
government seeks to condemn an individual's property, the majori-
tarian protections of the political process are not available. For this
reason, the Bill of Rights provides counter-majoritarian protections by
specifically prohibiting the government from engaging in certain be-
havior. Allowing the political process to govern property rights strips
property owners of these rights and thus frustrates the Constitution's
special protection for minority interests. If constitutional rights are
dependant upon a majority vote, one must wonder why the founders
went to the trouble of adding the Fifth Amendment.
3. The Just Compensation Requirement Provides Enough
Protection for Property Rights
Some have suggested that the restrictions of the takings clause are
satisfied once the government pays "just compensation" to the land-
owner. 141 The notion that government could take whatever property it
wishes so long as it paid for it has led one observer to declare,
"Whether you know it or not, your house is for sale .... , 142
Simply allowing a governmental entity to seize land by compen-
sating the landowner fails to protect property rights in two ways: (1) it
18See e.g. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("For protection
against abuses by legislatures... the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." (quoting
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877))).
19 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (Madison) (Carey and McClellan ed. 2001) (refer-
ring to the majority's insulation from government intrusion upon their liberties as the "republi-
can principle").
140 Id.
141 See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Do-
main, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1301 (1985) (noting that "[m]any of the causes of inefficient and
inequitable eminent domain actions could be eliminated by requiring governments to compen-
sate owners and the public...").
142 Kruckeberg, supra note 80, at 543.
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fails to give meaning to the constitutional text, and (2) it produces
inequitable results.
Merely requiring just compensation without a public use limitation
ignores the plain text of the Fifth Amendment. There is nothing in
the text to suggest that the Public Use and Just Compensation Clauses
are a mere tautology. 143  Furthermore, "there is something deeply
troubling about a constitutional provision that has been effectively
rendered a nullity by judicial interpretation." ' A" Courts should not
reject their role as the defenders of citizens' constitutional rights. 1
45
Relying solely upon the Just Compensation Clause can create in-
equitable results that fail to protect a landowner's property rights.
"Just" compensation has been defined as the current market value at
which a willing seller would sell the land in question to a willing
buyer;146 it does not take into account the amount of money that the
landowner will need to purchase a comparable property as a replace-
ment. 1
47
Presumably, if the landowner were willing to sell at the market
price she would have done so. In many cases, the landowner may
have sought to retain the land because of subjective sentimental value.
While the Constitution does not require that the government take into
account the landowner's subjective value, it does require that it only
be invaded for a public use. Without such use it is hardly fair to
claim that the compensation is "just."
C. The Strict Scrutiny Test Is Not Completely Incompatible with
Current Takings Jurisprudence.
Adopting the strict scrutiny approach suggested in this note does
not require a total abandonment of current eminent domain jurispru-
dence. In fact, it is quite possible that some of the major cases could
have survived strict scrutiny and reached the same conclusion.
It is conceivable that Berman could have had the same outcome
under the strict scrutiny test as it did under the rational basis test. If
143See id. at 566-67 (noting that the common law canon expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius - the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another - suggests that because there are two
clauses, each must have a separate meaning).
4 Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849, 850 (1994).
145 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 464 (2003) (stating that, "[a] pri-
mary function of the federal courts is to provide relief against governments and government
officers for their violations of the Constitution...").
146 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 471 (1973).
147See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("We have held
that fair market value does not include the special value of property to the owner arising from its
adaptability to his particular use." (internal citations omitted)).
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the District of Columbia could have shown that the taking would have
actually helped decrease crime or promote health then perhaps it
could have overcome the presumption that the use is private in nature.
Promoting health and reducing crime are unquestionably compelling
interests; the only question remaining would be whether the action
was narrowly tailored towards furthering those interests, or whether
the government's actual intent was to benefit a private entity. Be-
cause the legislative description of the act is not dispositive under the
strict scrutiny test, there would not be the problem of arbitrary decla-
rations of blight, and a municipality could not simply declare any act
to be a promotion of public health. Determining whether a proposed
action will promote health or reduce crime would be a triable issue of
fact that the courts are well equipped to resolve.
Perhaps the State of Hawaii could have shown that concentrated
land ownership really did have an effect on the residential fee simple
market and that reducing this concentration was a compelling interest.
If such a finding could have been made then the taking could have
proceeded; if not then the taking should have been prohibited as being
private in nature, and thus running contrary to the protections of the
Public Use Clause.
Regardless of how these major cases would have been decided, it
seems clear that under a strict scrutiny analysis, much of the abuse
described above in Part II would not have happened. For example, it
is unlikely that Merriam, Kansas would have been able to convince a
court that having a BMW dealership rather than a used car dealership
rose to the level of being a compelling interest. Fortunately, as de-
scribed in the next section, a few courts have been brave enough to
strike down some of the most blatant of eminent domain abuses.
PART IV: THE PENDULUM IS SWINGING BACK IN FAVOR OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
in spite of the proliferation of eminent domain abuse described in
Part II of this Note, cases such as Bailey suggest that the tide may be
turning back in favor of protecting property rights. Recent cases re-
veal that there have been an increasing number of courts willing to
adjudicate the merits of public use claims.
A. Public Use Comes Full Circle: The Fall of Poletown
In a recently decided case, County of Wayne v. Hathcock,148 the
Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the legality of a taking proposed
148 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).
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by the county to make room for the development of a business and
technology park dubbed the "Pinnacle Project." 49  While there is
nothing particularly novel about the factual setting in Hathcock, the
decision itself has the potential to cause a fundamental shift in public
use jurisprudence.
The dispute in Hathcock centered around forty-six parcels of land
directly south of the area's primary airport.1 50 The county began pur-
chasing land surrounding the airport from those who were willing to
sell. All but nineteen land owners sold their land to the county, but
these remaining properties were "distributed in a checkerboard fash-
ion throughout the project area."'' 51 "The county apparently deter-
mined that further efforts to negotiate additional voluntary sales
would be futile and decided instead to invoke the power of eminent
domain.' 52 Thus, "the Wayne County Commission adopted a Reso-
lution of Necessity and Declaration of Taking" authorizing the county
to seize the remaining nineteen parcels desired for the project. 53
The county claimed that the land was needed because, by develop-
ing the park, the landowners' properties would create the following
public benefits:
(1) the creation of jobs for its citizens, (2) the stimulation of
private investment and redevelopment in the county to insure
a healthy and growing tax base so that the county can fund
and deliver critical public services, (3) stemming the tide of
disinvestment and population loss, and (4) supporting devel-
opment opportunities which would otherwise remain unreal-
ized.
15 4
The county initiated condemnation actions and each of the landown-
ers challenged the constitutionality of the taking, claiming that it did
not serve a public purpose as required by the Michigan Constitu-
tion. 55 Relying primarily on the Michigan Supreme Court's decision
in Poletown, the trial court affirmed the county's Takings Resolution,
149 Id. at 770.
150 Id.
Is' Id. at 771.
152 id.
1531Id.
154 Id. at 775-76 (quoting city's complaint for condemnation).
155 Because of the broad delegation of authority to the state in Midkiff, there was little room
to claim protection under the United States Constitution. But see discussion infra at Part
IV.B.2; thus, the primary avenue of relief available to landowners was through state constitu-
tions. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L REV. 489 (1977) (suggesting that parties turn to state constitutions for
liberties beyond those guaranteed by the United States Constitution).
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and the trial court's opinion was itself affirmed on appeal. However,
Judges Murray and Fitzgerald of the Michigan Court of Appeals
wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, but stating that in their
opinion, "Poletown was poorly reasoned, wrongly decided, and ripe
for reversal by [the Michigan Supreme Court]. ' 156  The Michigan
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and ordered the parties to dis-
cuss the following three issues:
(1) whether [the county] has the authority, pursuant to [the
Michigan takings statute] or otherwise, to take [the landown-
ers'] properties; (2) whether the proposed taking, which are at
least partly intended to result in later transfers to private enti-
ties, are for a "public purpose," pursuant to Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit; and (3) whether the "public
purpose" test set forth in Poletown, is consistent with [the
Michigan Constitution] and, if not, whether this test should be
overruled. 15
7
Considering each of these issues in turn, the Michigan Supreme Court
first held that the taking was within the confines of the state takings
statute. The statute grants the county the authority to make such a
taking if it follows the procedures established by statute. The court
held that the county did follow these procedures. 58
Next, the court considered whether the taking was for a "public
purpose." The court also answered this question in the affirmative. 159
"A 'public purpose' has been defined as that which 'has for its objec-
tive the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general wel-
fare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or
residents within the municipal corporation, the sovereign powers of
which are used to promote such public purpose."' 60 Yet while the
court rules that the taking is a public purpose, they emphasize that,
"[this] is not to say, of course, that the exercise of eminent domain in
this case passes constitutional muster . . . it must also be determined
whether these condemnations pass the more narrow requirements of
our Constitution."'
16 1
The court concluded that the taking did not meet constitutional re-
quirements for three reasons. First, it noted that the project is not one
156 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 772.
'57 Id. (internal citations omitted).
'
5 8 Id. at 772-74.
1
5 9 Id. at 773-76.
160 Id. at 776 (internal citations omitted).
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in which the particular pieces of property in question are needed for
completion:
To the contrary, the landscape of our country is flecked with
shopping centers, office parks, clusters of hotels, and centers
of entertainment and commerce. We do not believe, and [the
county] does not contend, that these constellations required
the exercise of eminent domain or any other form of collec-
tive public action for their formation.
1 62
Second, the court stated that the project is not subject to public
oversight to ensure that it continues to be used for the public benefit
after transfer to the private entities. "No formal mechanisms exist to
ensure that the businesses that would occupy what are now [the land-
owners'] properties will continue to contribute to the health of the
local economy."' 163 Finally, the court noted that "there is nothing in
the act of condemning defendants' properties that serves the public
good in this case. The only public benefits cited by [the county] arise
after the lands are acquired by the government and put to private
use." 164 The court distinguishes this from takings which are made in
order to actually promote public health or safety, such as slum clear-
ance.
The court acknowledged that the only support for the county's po-
sition was the majority opinion in Poletown. The court criticized that
decision, stating, "the majority opinion in Poletown is most notable
for its radical and unabashed departure from the entirety of this
Court's pre-1963 eminent domain jurisprudence." 165 The Hathcock
court criticized the Poletown court for basing its opinion on:
... a plurality opinion of this Court and.., an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court concerning judicial review of
congressional acts under the Fifth Amendment of the federal
constitution. Neither case, of course, is binding on this Court
in construing the takings clause of our state Constitution, and
neither is persuasive authority for the use to which they were
put by the Poletown majority. 66
The Hathcock court then directed its criticism to the real problem
in Poletown:
162 Id. at 783-84.
163 Id. at 784.
164Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 785.
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[T]he Poletown majority concluded, for the first time in the
history of our eminent domain jurisprudence, that a general-
ized economic benefit was sufficient under [the Michigan
Constitution] to justify the transfer of condemned property to
a private entity. Before Poletown, we had never held that a
private entity's pursuit of profit was a 'public use' for consti-
tutional takings purposes simply because one entity's profit
maximization contributed to the health of the general econ-
omy.167 . . . Consequently, the Poletown analysis provides no
legitimate support for the condemnations proposed in this
case and, for the reasons stated above, is overruled.1 68
By overruling Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court removed
the foundation upon which the concept of takings for private devel-
opment was built. Now that Poletown has fallen, will Midkiff be
next? Even before Hathcock was decided, some state-and even a
few federal-courts were beginning to reclaim their right to adjudi-
cate public use claims.
B. Examples of Other Courts Refusing to Defer Public Use
Determinations to the Legislature
1. State Cases
A number of states have begun to consider the merits of whether a
taking is public or private in nature, rather than yielding to legislative
determinations.
The New Jersey Superior Court made such a determination in Ca-
sino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin.169 The case arose
from a proposed eminent domain action to condemn a hotel and trans-
fer the property to Donald Trump for redevelopment. 70 Interestingly,
the Banin court did not base its decision on either the state or federal
constitution, and did not doubt the ability of the government to con-
demn the property for its purported use. 17 1 What did concern the
1
6 7 Id. at 786.
118 Id. at 787.
169 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. 1998).
170 d. at 103-04.
171 See id. at 103 (framing the issue in the case as whether the government entity is "vested
with the power of eminent domain and has appropriately exercised the power").
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court was that there was no guarantee that Trump would continue to
use the property for the purpose proffered by the government.
172
The Banin case is significant because it shows the willingness of a
court to require that the government actually follow through on its
alleged public purpose. Because the city claimed that building a hotel
was a public use, the court wanted assurance that a hotel would actu-
ally be built; otherwise, "the asserted public benefits are illusory.' 173
While Banin is a step in the right direction because the court recog-
nized a limitation on the eminent domain power, it failed to provide
anything other than a formalistic requirement upon the taker, rather
than a defense of the original property owner's rights. It appears that
the court would have had no objection had there been a contract re-
quiring Trump to use the property for the stated redevelopment pur-
pose with greater specificity than a mere requirement that it conform
to its stated purpose for a "reasonable time."
The Illinois Supreme Court used a different rationale when striking
down a proposed taking in Southwestern Illinois Development Au-
thority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C.174 National City in-
volved the Southwestern Illinois Development Authority ("SWIDA"),
which was a municipal corporation charged with the task of promot-
ing "industrial, commercial, residential, service, transportation and
recreational activities and facilities." 17 5 A local racetrack, which had
become extremely popular, contacted SWIDA about expanding its
parking facilities. 76  The racetrack's proposed solution was for
SWIDA to condemn the land of a neighboring recycling plant so the
racetrack could expand its parking lot. 177 The racetrack had explored
the possibility of constructing a parking garage on its own property,
but determined that acquiring the neighboring property through
SWIDA's eminent domain power would be cheaper. 78 SWIDA sued
to initiate an eminent domain action, and the recycling plant defended
by claiming that the taking was not for a public use. 179 The county
circuit court held for SWIDA, but the appellate court reversed, hold-
ing that SWIDA exceeded its constitutional authority. 80 The Illinois
172 Id. ("Although [the government] claims that there are adequate safeguards to prevent
Trump from changing the use of the properties .... the vague language merely states that Trump
must maintain the use for a 'reasonable time."' (internal citation omitted)).
173 Id.
174768 N.E.2d 1 (11. 2002).
175 Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted).
176 Id. at 4.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 6.
17 9 Id. at 5-6.
180 Id. at 6-7.
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Supreme Court agreed to hear SWIDA's appeal and affirmed the ap-
pellate court's ruling that that SWIDA's proposed taking was uncon-
stitutional.18
1
The Illinois Supreme Court held that SWIDA's action was barred
by both the Illinois and the United States Constitutions.182 While
other courts, such as the court in Bailey, had used state constitutional
provisions to invalidate takings, the National City court appears to be
the first to hold that an action violates the United States Constitution.
The National City court conducted an analysis of the facts to deter-
mine whether the action in question was a legitimate use of the police
power, as authorized by Berman,'83 and not a purely private taking as
prohibited by Midkiff.184
In declaring SWIDA's actions to be unconstitutional, the court
first noted that in order for the taking to be considered a "public use,"
the public must be allowed to use the land by right, not merely by
permission of the owners as the case would be with a private parking
lot.185 The court then rejected SWIDA's determination that the land
in question was "blighted." 186
Unfortunately, the court did not provide guidance or a specific test
to apply to future cases. Instead, it apparently did not need such a
test, stating that "[w]e do not require a bright-line test to find that this
taking bestows a purely private benefit and lacks a showing of a sup-
porting legislative purpose."' 87 The court clearly did not object to all
takings, 188 but it is unclear how it would determine the boundaries of
the eminent domain power and where it would draw the line between
public and private use. What is significant is that it was willing to
draw such a line rather than acquiesce to the legislature.
2. Federal Cases
Twenty years after Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,189 a few
federal courts have begun to express an interest in reclaiming their
authority to make public use determinations.
181 Id. at 7.
182 Id. at 7-11.
183 Id.
84Id. at 9.
185 Id. (intemal citations omitted).
186 Id.
1871d. at 10.
188 See id. at 11 ("We do not question the legislature's discretion in allowing for the exer-
cise of eminent domain power..
189 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Development Agency' 90 in-
volved a dispute regarding a shopping center in Lancaster, California.
The shopping center had several anchor stores such as Costco, Wal-
Mart, and Circuit City.' 9' The controversy began when a 99 Cents
Only Store ("99 Cents") moved into a vacant lot next to Costco.
92
Almost immediately after 99 Cents moved in, Costco threatened that
unless Lancaster provided additional space for Costco to expand, it
would relocate to another city.193 The owners of the shopping center
determined that the most efficient manner in which Costco could ex-
pand would be to develop the land bordering the south side of their
store, which ran behind 99 Cents.' 94 Costco refused and demanded to
expand into the space actually occupied by 99 Cents. 95 Because the
shopping center considered Costco to be an "anchor tenant," and
feared that Costco would relocate, the city began condemnation pro-
ceedings against 99 Cents to make way for Costco's expansion. 96 99
Cents responded by filing a § 1983 action in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, claiming that the private
nature of the taking violated the Public Use Clause.
97
The district court ruled in favor of 99 Cents, stating that the taking
was purely private:
[Tihe evidence is clear beyond dispute that Lancaster's con-
demnation efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to
achieve the naked transfer of property from one private party
to another. Indeed, Lancaster itself admits that the only rea-
son it enacted the [condemnation resolution] was to satisfy
the private expansion demands of Costco.
98
The court then attacked the city's justification for claiming that the
use was public. The city argued that it had the power to condemn the
land in order to prevent future blight. The court rejected this argu-
ment, and proclaimed that the eminent domain power would be with-
out limit if cities could use it to prevent the prospect of some future
unforeseen problem.99
190237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
191 Id. at 1125.
192 Id. at 1126.
193Id.
194Id.
195 Id.
196Id.
197 Id. at 1125.
198 Id. at 1129.
199Id. at 1130-31.
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Another federal case testing the outer boundaries of public use de-
terminations was Daniels v. Area Planning Commission of Allen
County.20 In Daniels, a county agency sought to condemn a restric-
tive covenant preventing the plaintiffs' land, and surrounding proper-
ties, from being used for commercial development in order to build a
shopping center.20' Plaintiffs filed a § 1983 complaint in district court
to enjoin the taking and obtain a declaratory judgment that the taking
was unconstitutional under the Public Use Clause.20 2 The district
court issued the injunction, granted the declaratory judgment, and
struck down the statute authorizing the county agency to condemn the
land since it allowed the government to take land for private uses.203
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with much of the district
court's logic, but narrowed the decision's effect to the facts of the
case. The appeals court held that while the statute was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the plaintiffs, it had "potential constitutional ap-
plications," and thus was not facially unconstitutional.204 The court
then brainstormed potential constitutional applications:
[T]he ... commission could find that the [taking] would sub-
stantially advance the health, safety and welfare of the com-
munity. For example if the commission found that an area
was under-served by doctors' or dentists' offices, or day care
facilities, and the [taking] would substantially serve to fill
that need, then the [taking] could be found to be in the public
interest. °5
While it certainly seems odd that the possibility of a future short-
age of day care facilities could save a statute from being unconstitu-
tional, this is consistent with the "conceivable public purpose" lan-
guage of Midkiff.20 6 A constitutional right does not seem to provide
much protection if it is based on the creativity and brainstorming
abilities of the court rather than an independent test, and Daniels goes
no further in providing such a test than the other cases have. How-
ever, at least a federal court was willing to admit that the Public Use
Clause could be exceeded by a municipality, even if it was only lim-
ited to the specific facts at bar.207
200 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002).
2
0
1 Id. at 450-51.
20
2 Id. at 449.
203 Id. at 45 1.
204 Id. at 468-69.
205 Id. at 469.
2
06 Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (emphasis added).20 7 The Supreme Court heard a case this Term that directly challenges the use of eminent
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C. Courts Need to Apply a Consistent Test
The cases described above are significant examples of courts adju-
dicating the merits of public use challenges rather than abdicating that
role to the legislature. While this is a step forward for property rights,
these cases fail to create a consistent test that future courts could use
when confronted with a similar scenario. The test proposed in this
Note would enable the construction of a consistent body of case law
for interpreting the Public Use Clause. While such a test would un-
doubtedly encroach somewhat upon the sovereign power that the state
may otherwise hold, it has been written that "State Legislatures retain
all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the State Constitu-
tions; which are not expressly taken away by the Constitution of the
United States.,,20 8 The Fifth Amendment removes the power to take
property for a private purpose, just as the First Amendment removes
the government's ability to block speech. The test proffered in this
Note requires the judiciary to guard this constitutional safeguard
rather than yield such responsibility to the legislature.
CONCLUSION
The current state of eminent domain jurisprudence fails to protect
the rights of the individual property owner from the despotic power of
the state. 209 Alexander Hamilton wrote that limitations placed upon
the legislature could only be preserved "through the medium of courts
of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the constitution void."210
In order to give meaning to the Public Use Clause it is imperative
that courts exercise their role as the interpreters and defenders of the
Constitution; leaving the matter to the legislature creates too strong an
incentive for abuse. Blight should mean blight, and public use should
mean only those uses that are actually public. When a case or contro-
versy presents itself, the courts have a duty to resolve the issue; de-
ferring this responsibility to the legislature carries the risk that our
domain for private development. As of the time this Note was written the Court had not yet
issued its opinion, but the decision has the potential to either completely resolve this issue in
favor of property owners, or endorse the status quo actions of municipalities and perhaps en-
courage even bolder private development efforts. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 27
(2004).
208 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Wall.) 386, 387 (1798) (emphasis added).209See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 312 (1795) (describing the taking
power as a "despotic power" of the state).210 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey and McClellan ed.
2001).
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constitutional rights themselves will be "blighted"-whatever that
means.
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